Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD), which is immune to all possible detector side channel attacks, enables two remote legitimate users to perform secure communications without quantum repeaters. With the help of a central node, TF-QKD is expected to overcome the linear key-rate constraint using current technologies. However, the security of the former TF-QKD protocols relies on the hypothesis of infinite-key and stable sources. In this paper, we present the finite-key analysis of a practical decoy-state twin-field quantum key distribution with variant statistical fluctuation models. We examine the composable security of the protocol with intensity fluctuations of unstable sources employing Azuma's inequality. Our simulation results indicate that the secret key rate is able to surpass the linear key-rate bound with limited signal pulses and intensity fluctuations. In addition, the effect of intensity fluctuations is extremely significant for small size of total signals.
mission loss of optical pulses, which is an intrinsic property of the quantum channels, has significantly limited the communication distance between the legitimate users [5, 6] .
In order to break the limitation of channel transmittance, the quantum repeater scheme was proposed. Unfortunately, quantum repeaters are impractical to be implemented with current quantum communication technologies [7] [8] [9] . On the other side, Lo et al. [10] proposed the measurement-deviceindependent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol to prevent all possible detector side channel attacks. Nevertheless, MDI-QKD cannot remove the bottleneck of longdistance quantum communication either.
Recently, Lucamarini et al. [11] proposed the unprecedented twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) scheme which was conjectured to overcome the rate-distance limit without trusted relays. Based on singlephoton interference at the beamsplitter of an untrusted node, the secret key rate of TF-QKD achieved a quadratic improvement over the traditional phase-encoding scheme of MDI-QKD [12] . Considering the huge benefit that the secret key rate scales with the square-root of the channel transmittance, several variations of this cutting-edge TF-QKD protocol have been proposed to offer a more rigorous security proof [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Subsequently, experiments related to these variant protocols were carried out to prove the feasibility of TF-QKD with current technologies [21] [22] [23] [24] . Nonetheless, there still remains an inevitable gap between theories and the practical imperfections. Among these experimental limitations, finite-size effect is a nonnegligible character in the estimation of the ultimate secret key rate [25, 26] . Several finite-key analyses have been proposed to study the practicalities of some TF-QKD pro-tocols [27, 28] . Another weakness we cannot neglect is the instability of the photon source.
Instead of the stable source employed in the original TF-QKD protocol, the real system always emits photon pulses whose intensities cannot be asymptotically replaced by a constant value [29] [30] [31] [32] .
In this work, we focus on the practical decoy-state [33] [34] [35] TF-QKD scheme proposed by Grasselli et al. [36] . The decoystate TF-QKD protocol has two main advantages in real-life implementation: (1) This TF-QKD protocol is capable enough to beat the PLOB bound with only two decoy states.
(2) The protocol is quite robust against phase misalignments due to the phase randomization of decoy pulses. We utilize different statistical fluctuation analysis models [37] [38] [39] [40] to perform the parameter estimation step of the two decoy states TF-QKD protocol.
Based on the universally composable framework [41] [42] [43] , we obtain a tight secret key rate bound with statistical fluctuations. In the case without intensity fluctuations, we make a brief comparison of the final secret key rates estimated by variant statistical fluctuation analysis tools. However, when analyzing the effect of intensity fluctuations, we noticed that the correlation between two detection events cannot be ignored. Hense, we present a tight finite-key analysis utilizing Azuma's inequality [44, 45] to prove the composable security against general attacks with the existence of intensity fluctuations.
Through numerical simulations, we investigate the secret key rates of different total signal pulses with statistical fluctuations and intensity fluctuations. The simulation results indicate that intensity fluctuations have a nonnegligible impact on the performance of the practical decoy-state TF-QKD protocol.
The article is organized as follows. In Sec.
II, we present the practical decoy-state TF-QKD protocol. In Sec. III, we provide the parameter estimations of the finite-key analysis with or without the existence of intensity fluctuations. In addition, the numerical simulations are demonstrated in Sec. IV. The conclusion of our work is presented in Sec.
V.

II. PRACTICAL DECOY STATE TF-
QKD PROTOCOL\\
The twin-field type quantum key distribution protocol proposed in [17] is able to overcome the secret key rate bound effectively.
According to the two decoy states method proposed in [36] , we constructed the practical form of this TF-QKD protocol in finite-key regime:
(i) State preparation. The two legitimate users Alice and Bob choose Z-basis (X-basis) independently with probability P Z (P X = 1 − P Z ). If Z-basis is chosen, Alice (Bob) prepares the signal pulses with her (his) trusted coherent state source. In this mode, Alice (Bob) firstly generates a secret key bit
Then, Alice (Bob) prepares a coherent state (v) Error correction. In order to obtain an identical key bit string, Alice and Bob carry out an information reconciliation scheme.
They sacrifice leak EC bits to perform the error correction step. After that, Alice consumes log 2 (1/ε cor ) bits of her string Z A to perform a random two-universal hash function and sends the hash to Bob. If the hash of Bob's string Z B is different from that of Z A , they abort the protocol.
(vi) Privacy amplification. To ensure that the information leakage is under control, they exploit a random two-universal hash function to their secret key strings to extract a more private key string with length l.
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATIONS\\
A. Secrecy analysis
To provide a tight finite-key analysis, we exploit the universally composable framework as the benchmark of our security analysis [26, 39] . The final key string that Alice 
The final key is ε sec -secret from Eve if
where ρ Z ′ A E is the joint quantum state of Alice's final key Z ′ A and Eve, U Z ′ A is the mixed state of all possible values of Z ′ A . · 1 denotes the trace norm which indicates that the
Here we obtain the secret key rate R by deriving the private key string length l with the decoy-state method provided in [36, 39] . According to the universally composable framework definition [41] , we provide the detailed estimation of the secret key length in Appendix A. The practical TF-QKD protocol in the finite-key regime is ε sec -secret if the length l of the final key satisfies:
is the binary Shannon entropy function. Note that
represents the bits we sacrifice to perform the error correction step, where f is the error correction inefficiency.
Subsequently, the secret key rate can be obtained by R = l/N .
B. Finite-key analysis without intensity fluctuations
In our practical TF-QKD protocol, the successful detection events s Z , s X and the bit error rate E Z µ can be directly observed in real experiments. Thus the key issue of our finitekey analysis is the parameter estimation of the unknown phase error rate E Z ph . In this subsection, we demonstrate the derivation of the upper bound of E Z ph with the successful detection events observed in the sifting step.
A tighter security bound is obtained by applying the random sampling method.
For simplicity, we assume that the lossy channel is symmetrical for Alice and Bob.
The total number of signal pulses when both parties choose Z-basis (X-basis) is denoted as N Z (N X ). The successful detection events corresponding to the X-basis are denoted as s X AB , the subscripts represent the intensities µ A and µ B chosen by Alice and Bob in the decoy-state preparation step. We notice that s X = s X AB is the total amount of successful detection events in the X-basis. Note that s X AB can be directly observed in the sifting step after both parties announced their intensity choices of the decoy pulses.
Here, we denote S nm as the set of successful detection events that Alice (Bob) sends out n (m) photons in the decoy pulse. We denote s nm as the total amount of set S nm . The probability P AB|nm denotes the conditional probability that Alice (Bob) chooses µ A (µ B ) as the intensity of the decoy pulse given that the signal contains n (m) photons. The successful detection events s X AB,nm denotes that Alice (Bob) sends out n (m) photons with the intensity choice of the decoy pulse being µ A (µ B ). The eavesdropper Eve cannot change the values of s nm after Charlie made the announcements. For a set of unknown but fixed values of s nm , we have that
where τ AB i,nm = 1 with probability P AB|nm and otherwise 0. The expectation value of s X AB,nm with respect to τ AB i,nm variables can be obtained by s * ,X AB,nm = P AB|nm s nm .
Subsequently, the expectation value of s X AB is given by
In this case, Eve cannot change the mean value of s X AB after Charlie's announcements. Thus, the yields and phase error rate estimated by the expectation values of s X AB cannot be changed either. Let Y nm denote the yield when Alice (Bob) sends out n (m) photons. We notice that s nm = N X P n P m Y nm , where P n (P m ) is the probability that Alice (Bob) sends out n (m) photons in X-basis.
The expectation value s * ,X AB can be rewritten as
where P n|A = e −µA µ A n /n! and P m|B =
With the observed values s X AB obtained in the sifting step, we can calculate the upper bounds and lower bounds of the expectation values s * ,X AB with our parameter estimation method. Then Eq. (7) can be substituted by the following inequality
where s * ,X AB (s * ,X AB ) is the lower bound (upper bound) of s * ,X AB .
To find the upper bound of the phase error rate E Z ph , one needs to deal the following issues: (1) The estimation of s * ,X AB and s * ,X AB with the successful detection events s X AB observed in the sifting step. (2) The estimation of E Z ph with the decoy-state method and random sampling without replacement method.
The first issue can be solved by applying variant statistical fluctuation models to the observed values s X AB . We exploit Hoeffding's inequality [37] , the multiplicative Chernoff bound [39] and the improved Chernoff 
where δ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1) and g (x, y) =
. According to the above equations, we can estimate the upper bound and lower bound of the observed value with a fixed expectation value. However, the fixed expectation value τ * mentioned in our finitekey analysis is unknown. We notice that the expectation value τ * can be bounded by
where τ * = τ 1 − δ and τ * = τ /(1 + δ) denote the upper bound and lower bound of the expectation value τ * . Then the probabilities that τ * exceeds the upper bound τ * and the lower bound τ * can be denoted as ε = g −δ, τ 1 − δ and ε = g (δ, τ /(1 + δ)). In this way, given an observed value τ and failure probabilities ε and ε, δ and δ can be obtained by solving the following equations
Now we can utilize the improved Chernoff bound to obtain the upper bound s * ,X AB and lower bound s * ,X AB of the successful detection events s X AB :
where δ and δ can be calculated by
We notice that Eq. (13) is difficult to solve when the observed values s X AB are large. In this case, we adopt the simplified approximation provided in [40] for s X AB ≥ −6 ln ε (s X AB ≥ −6 ln ε). The simplified form can be expressed as
Here, we have obtained the upper bound and lower bound of the expectation values s * ,X AB with the observables s X AB . In order to address the second issue, the following two steps are involved. On the one hand, we utilize According to the estimation method presented in [17] , the upper bound of the bit error rate in the X-basis of the TF-QKD protocol can be given by
Considering that we have employed the two decoy states method in our parameter estimation, we can calculate the upper bound of E X µ by utilizing the upper bounds of the yields estimated above and asymptotically replace the upper bounds of the other yields by 1. Then we can rewrite Eq. (15) as 
On the other hand, the phase error rate E Z ph cannot be simply replaced by the bit error rate E X µ when the total signal pulses are limited. Considering the influence of statistical fluctuations, we employ the random sampling without replacement method proposed in [46] to provide a tighter bound for the phase error rate E Z ph . Based on an approximate hypergeometric distribution formula, the upper bound of the phase error rate E Z ph can be described as
with a failure probability ε ′′ , where
. 
where µ i is the intensity of the decoy pulse with i ∈ {0, 1}, and δ µ represents the fluctuation magnitude of the intensities.
Here, Azuma's inequality [44] 
A , . . . , n N A which contains N + 1 trials and satisfies the above conditions with c i = 1, n N A can be bounded by Azuma's inequality 21) for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Then, let η 0 A , η 1 A , . . . , η N A be a set of N + 1 random but dependent variables that η i A ∈ {0, 1}. We define the ith trial of the sequence
is the expectation value of the set η 1 A , . . . , η N A . We find that the sequence defined by Eq. (21) is a Martingale and satisfies the bounded difference condition with c i = 1. Hence, Azuma's inequality can be applied to the sequence. Then, the expectation value τ * ,N A can be bounded by
Utilizing Azuma's inequality, we can obtain the upper bound and lower bound of the ex-
with failure probabilitiesε A and ε A , wherê and P µ1 = 1 − P µ0 . We fix ε sec = 10 −10 and ε cor = 10 −12 .
In our practical TF-QKD scheme, phase misalignment does not affect the phase error rates due to the phase randomization of the decoy pulses. Thus, the protocol is robust against small phase misalignments. In this case, the polarization and phase misalignments of the optical pulses after traveling through the quantum channels are fixed to 2% which is the same as the original practical TF-QKD protocol [36] . The successful detection events s X AB , s Z and the bit error rate in Z-basis E Z µ are directly obtained by the legitimate users after sifting step in real experiments. Here, these observed values are simulated by the linear channel loss model provided in Appendix D.
In Fig. 1 , we simulate the secret key rate of the practical TF-QKD with finite-key size using the multiplicative Chernoff bound.
Here, we demonstrate the performance of the protocol with different amounts of total signals. As shown in Fig. 1 , the protocol is capable enough to beat the PLOB bound with a total photon number of 10 12 even when the dark count rate of the detectors is P d = 10 −7 .
However, the finite-key effect is more significant if the dark count rate is smaller.
To figure out the tightest analytical bound of our practical TF-QKD protocol, we compare the performances of Hoeffding's inequality [37] , the multiplicative Chernoff bound [39] and the improved Chernoff bound [40] . As shown in Fig. 2 , the re- sults demonstrate that the secret key rate estimated by the improved Chernoff bound is the tightest among three different methods.
However, the advantages are diminutive especially when the total number of signal pulses is large.
In the case that the photon sources are the dark count rate is fixed to P d = 10 −8 . Fig.   3 shows that if δ µ is too large, the protocol cannot beat the PLOB bound.
In order to evaluate the effect of the total amount of signal pulses in the presence of intensity fluctuations, we estimate the secret key rates with different number of total signal pulses given a fixed δ µ . The results shown in Fig. 4 indicate that the effect of δ µ is extremely significant when the data sizes of signal pulses are small. In the main text, we provide the finite-key analysis with the improved Chernoff bound.
As a comparison, we utilize Hoeffding's inequality [37] and the multiplicative Chernoff bound [39] to acquire the tightest key rate bound. Here, we follow the definitions given in the main text. Let τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ n be a set of n independent Bernoulli random variables that
denote an observed outcome. The mean value of the set is denoted as τ * = n i=1 P i . By applying Hoeffding's inequality, the upper bound and lower bound of the expectation value τ * can be obtained by
with failure probabilitiesε H and ε H sepa-
and g H (x, y) = x/2 ln (1/y).
In order to employ the multiplicative (C1)
We define T * ,X AB := e µA+µB (P A P B N X ) −1 s * ,X AB . Then, Eq. (C1) can be rewritten as
where T * ,X AB = e µA+µB (P A P B N X ) −1 s * ,X AB , T * ,X AB = e µA+µB (P A P B N X ) −1 s * ,X AB .
(C3)
Here, the decoy-state method proposed in [37] can be directly applied to Eq. (C2). The upper bound of Y 1,1 can be obtained by
where Γ 1,1 = T * ,X 00 + T * ,X 11 − T * ,X 01 − T * ,X 10 .
The upper bound of Y 2,0 and Y 0,2 are given by
where Γ 2,0 = µ 1 T * ,X 00 + µ 0 T * ,X 11 − µ 0 T * ,X 01 − µ 1 T * ,X 10 , Γ 0,2 = µ 1 T * ,X 00 + µ 0 T * ,X 11 − µ 1 T * ,X 01 − µ 0 T * ,X 10 .
(C7)
In order to obtain the upper bound of Y 0,0 , we need the lower bound of Y 2,2 and the upper bounds of Y n,0 and Y 0,m .
The upper bounds of Y n,0 and Y 0,m are given by Y n,0 = n! (e µ0 − e µ1 ) (µ 0 − µ 1 + µ 1 e µ0 − µ 0 e µ1 ) − Γ 2,0 (µ 0 − µ 1 ) (µ n 0 − µ n 1 )
, Y 0,m = m! (e µ0 − e µ1 ) (µ 0 − µ 1 + µ 1 e µ0 − µ 0 e µ1 ) − Γ 0,2
.
(C8)
The lower bound of Y 2,2 is given by
(C10)
